Feb 20 2014自由時報社論
為何自動迎合「一個中國框架」?
國民黨榮譽主席連戰,週二到北京會見了中共總書記習近平,「連習會」不是 第一次,但是在「王張會」之後,這是習近平連續性的出牌,自詡「知台」的這名中國國家主席特意選擇在這個場合,對台提出了四點主張;貫穿習近平談話的主軸 則是「兩岸同屬一個國家、同屬一個民族」。在這樣的舞台上,連戰成了道道地地的佈景,不論其述說了什麼,或者是否懷有什麼個別的政治或經濟目的。
在 二月十八日這個時機點釋出對台政策,相當符合過去中國領導人的行為慣性。二○一二年底在十八大展開接班的習近平,在全盤掌握黨政軍的控馭大權後,外界一直 在密切注意他會不會於今年春節期間公佈習近平時代的對台作為,因為其前任胡錦濤,也是在「江規胡隨」大約一年後,發表六點政策方針。這次,在陸委會與國台 辦所謂官方對話後,立即在幾天之內安排連戰去搭台,可以清楚看出其決策步驟,而且更具鋪排。
做為開國元勛之子,習近平的涉外作風,明顯比江 澤民、胡錦濤更霸氣與自信,因而更加原則性。檢視「習四點」的構成,包括「兩岸一家親」、「同屬一個國家,尊重台灣的社會制度和生活方式,願意分享大陸發 展的機遇」、「願在一個中國框架內,同台灣方面進行平等協商」,以及「兩岸共圓中華民族偉大復興的中國夢」,其實統整歸結起來只有一點,就是「一中框 架」。
這與「江八點」的「堅持一個中國原則」、「胡六點」的「恪守一個中國」,一以貫之,毫無改變。但其特點是強化民族主義的包裝,只做提 綱挈領,這與江澤民、胡錦濤分別鉅細靡遺地詳述兩岸領導人互訪、結束敵對狀態、達成和平協議等政治談判的進程,有相當地不同,可以反映出三代中共領導人各 自在黨內的不同地位。
習近平提出「一中框架」的原則性,是中國向來對外談判模式的再提煉,一旦台灣接受了這個框架,所有違背這個框架意涵的議題都會被自動排除,根本無須贅言。在「一中框架」下,習近平當然不能與馬英九在國際場域平起平坐,除非國民黨政權接受港澳模式。
同 時,連戰所提「正視中華民國的存在」,或馬英九有意地稱讚「王郁琦在大陸宣示中華民國」,當放置在這個框架之內時,全部都被納入同屬一個國家之中,只有時 間上的被繼承,也就是正視中華民國在一九四九年之前確實存在,而不存在正視兩岸當前由中華人民共和國與中華民國同時並存分治、可能造成「兩個中國」疑慮的 選項。習近平的思維脈絡已經非常明確,「各表」於是自然壽終正寢。更不必提馬英九與連戰所謂的「中華民國」,略去了增修條文的演進,是直接返回憲法本文的 定義,已經對北京做出主動的迎合。
過去歷任的中國領導人,要發表對台政策,通常只能隔海對著空氣講話,等待台灣當局的回應;隨著這些年台灣 政商權貴密集穿梭的情勢轉變,今天的習近平,要正式對台叫板。面前是隨時可有追求個人歷史定位、或者攫取並延續家族利益者當現成的聽眾,甚至,這些聽眾回 台後,或自動成為習近平開啟政治談判的美化與闡釋者,或政治行情受到北京加持作用,因而自認或被認為是勝選的保證,這尤其是習近平更為有恃無恐的基礎。
從「習四點」的提出,台灣人必須看到:台灣的國家利益,這個公共財,正被諸多不同動機的個人,拿去交易、貼現,已經出現可能流失耗減之虞。若要阻斷此一危機的蔓延,就是讓這些個人的目的無法在台灣的民意市場上遂願,或是釜底抽薪的有效做法
禁唱保衛大台灣
Feb 20 2014 自由廣場
◎ 陳逸南
一九五○年間風行一時而後被禁唱的一首反共歌曲 ─保衛大台灣,後來坊間出現了改作,「豆花傾倒擔,一碗兩角半」(閩南語),現在六、七十歲的人,談到改作就想起《保衛大台灣》歌曲,大家都記憶猶新。該 曲最後一、兩段為「我們已經無處後退,只有勇敢向前」,反映一九五○年間慌亂逃難者之心境及「退此一步,即無死所」之危機意識。
在二二八事件六十八週年前夕,重唱《保衛大台灣》反共歌曲,外來政權早已經由「衛台反共」變成「賣台親共」。馬英九政府急速「傾中」,出賣台灣主權,「王張會」已為「馬英九反獨急統」進程開了第一槍,令人相當憤怒與痛心。
這次高中課綱「微調」事件中,教育部官員惡意操縱,以及所謂學者專家曲解史實,按照「開羅宣言」與「波茨坦宣言」,認定台灣復歸中國統治,如此竄改歷史,利用政治謊言欺騙人民,令人難以接受。
事 實上,由「馬關條約」、「舊金山和約」及「中、日台北和約」等來看,「台灣不屬中國」是一項史實,也符合國際法原則、聯合國憲章及「人權兩公約」之規定。 目前台灣民意有七成民眾自認是台灣人不是中國人,且希望台灣不被中國併吞,期盼大家不要再受外來「少數統治者」一再欺騙,早日覺醒、團結,建立台灣新國 家。
(作者為台灣北社理事)
Op-Ed Contributor
Taiwan and China Edge Ever Closer
February 19, 2014
NOTTINGHAM, England — Government officials from China and Taiwan met last week for the first time in an official capacity in more than six decades. The talks were uneventful — producing modest agreements to establish communication channels and other practical arrangements — but they were symbolic of the strengthening of cross-Strait ties under President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan.
Since being elected in 2008, Mr. Ma has adopted a conciliatory approach toward China and pushed through a number of cooperative policies, including a free-trade agreement. While most Taiwanese strongly favor maintaining Taiwan's functional independence, Mr. Ma has started an irreversible trend toward closer ties and political negotiation with Beijing. Economic interaction is the force that drives this trend, but it's more comprehensive than one based on economics alone.
For decades, hostilities between the Kuomintang (K.M.T.) government in Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party led to a policy on the Taiwan side of 「no contact, no compromise and no negotiation.」 Even as China opened up and Taiwanese investors and manufacturers brought the two economies together, political relations remained deadlocked. Tentative contacts in the early 1990s were stalled by what Beijing called the 「secessionist」 policies of former presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.
When he became president in 2008, Mr. Ma announced that, contrary to his predecessor, he would accept the idea of 「one China, different interpretations」 that is Beijing's bottom-line position. Mr. Ma's unequivocal assurances soon led to the expansion of transportation links, suspension of competition for diplomatic allies and agreements on crime, food safety, tourism and education.
But Taiwan's separation from the mainland continues to remind China's leaders of colonial, in particular Japanese, bullying at the end of the 19th century. The new Chinese president, Xi Jinping, has held up the 「Chinese Dream」 as the maxim for his leadership, aiming to recapture the prestige that was lost during 「100 years of national shame.」 A major component of that goal is restoring lost territory, chiefly Taiwan, which was ceded to Japan in 1895 following the first of a series of military defeats and invasions that are the source of continuing Chinese antipathy. Defeat by the Communists in the Chinese civil war forced the K.M.T., and its army and supporters, to evacuate to Taiwan, where it ruled through martial law for four decades before steering the island toward democracy in the late 1980s.
It is only in recent months that Mr. Xi has been able to devote his energy to the Taiwan issue. Since his rise to the top of the Communist Party in late 2012, Mr. Xi has been preoccupied with consolidating power and setting out an ambitious plan to reform the economy, while launching an internal anticorruption campaign and managing deteriorating relations with Japan.
Mr. Xi showed his determination to press for political talks at an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Bali last October, where he told a Taiwanese representative that progress toward a political resolution must be accelerated.
Now that Mr. Xi's house is in better order, and as the China-friendly Mr. Ma enters the final two years of his presidency, there is a renewed sense of urgency in both camps.
Mr. Ma's many opponents, including those in his own party, note that his enthusiasm for pursuing links with China is not in line with public opinion. Surveys over the past 20 years show a consistently large majority of Taiwanese, over 80 percent in the most recent poll late last year, support some version of the status quo. Support for immediate or future unification was less than 12 percent.
Mr. Ma's approach will be put to the test in 2016 when voters go to the polls to choose his successor. Although some say that Mr. Ma has been overly accommodating, there is every reason to expect continuity in Taiwan's policy toward China if the K.M.T. retains the presidency. A victory for the Democratic Progressive Party, on the other hand, is likely to bring about a period of uncertainty in China-Taiwan relations. Long a staunch defender of Taiwan's autonomy, the D.P.P. has shown a willingness to engage with China, but the policy platform it recently put forward as a basis for conducting cross-Strait relations was swiftly rejected by Beijing.
Still, a D.P.P. victory would slow down the process, but is unlikely to reverse the long-term trend toward closer ties.
Taiwan's economy depends on trade, and China is its biggest export destination and source of a huge trade surplus. China is central to the supply chains of Taiwanese manufacturers, and 80 percent of Taiwanese foreign direct investment goes to China. A significant add-on to the free trade agreement in the area of services and trade awaits ratification in Taiwan's legislature.
Aside from this economic interdependence, China imposes its power on Taiwan in many ways, creating momentum that is difficult to withstand indefinitely. The area across the strait from Taiwan is lined with Chinese missiles. Chinese influence and opposition restricts Taiwan's participation in international society, including signing other bilateral and regional economic agreements. China exerts influence on hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese businesspeople residing in China, and has started to target Taiwanese politics, allegedly contributing to election campaigns, mobilizing influential supporters and investing in Taiwanese media.
Against these formidable pressures, Taiwan has limited resources to call upon. Its most potent weapon is its robust democracy. The moral support that Taiwan claims from the international community for its mode of governance is an important constraint on China. Any leader in Taipei who attempts to preserve the status quo of functional independence can rightly say that the government is merely following public opinion.
The Taiwanese people desire the peace and prosperity that positive relations with China could bring, yet they do not want to give up their sovereignty or democracy to achieve it. But Beijing's position is implacable, and its power and influence is inescapable. As it ramps up the pressure on Taiwan in different ways, there is an inevitable drift toward the unification that China craves.